UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-22-2014

Garner v. Garner Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41898

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Garner v. Garner Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41898" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5111.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5111

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

ANNE-MARIE KELSO
ISB #5500
1101 Pintail Street
Fruitland, ID 83619
(208) 230-1244
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MONICA GARNER,

)
) Supreme Court Docket 41898-2014
) Payette Case No.: CV 2010-000586
)
) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
)
)
)

Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER GARNER,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Payette County, to the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
The Honorable D. Duff McKee, Judge Presiding

Richard Eismann
Ryan Martinat
3016 Caldwell Boulevard
Nampa, ID 83651

Anne-Marie Kelso
1101 Pintail Street
Fruitland, ID 83619
(208) 230-1244

Attorneys for the Appellant, Monica Garner

Attorney for the Respondent, Christopher
Garner

FILED-COPY
SEP 2 2 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORTIES .................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY. ......................................... 1
FACTUAL HISTORY .............................................. 2
ISSUES ON APPEAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................ 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AN ORDER TO MODIFY A CHILD SUPPORT
A WARD AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND APPELLATE LEVEL ........... 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES .................. 6
ARGUMENT ........................................................... 7
THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE APPELLANT'S PETITION
AND THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY UPHELD THE MAGISTRATE'S
DECISION ....................................................... 7
THE ARGUMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT BEFORE THE
MAGISTRATE.............................................. 7
THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY ........ 8
EVEN IF MAGISTRATE LEE'S DECISION WAS IN ERROR, THE
APPELLANT FAILED TO ARGUE IT WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED
BY LAW OR IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW ............ 11

THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HER
FAILURE TO SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES ....................................................... 13

THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE A WARDED
APPELLANT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $2500, RESPONDENT'S
ATTORNEY FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $1012.50 AND FEES ON APPEAL. ......... 14
THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. ........... 20
CONCLUSION ............................................................. 21

ii

Table of Authorities
Case Law
Anti! v. Anti!, 127 Idaho, 954, 908 P.2d 1261 (Ct.App. 1996) ................ 6
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 23,855 P.2d 484,486 (Ct.App.1993) ......... 5
Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 987 P.2d 314,
133 Idaho 402 (Idaho 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 18
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002) .................... 6
Rumberger v. Rumberger, 134 Idaho 39, 995 P.2d 809 (2000) ................ 13
Izaguirre v. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229,
308 P.3d 929 (2013) ................................................. 7
Johannsen v. Utter beck 196 P .2d 341, 146 Idaho 423 (2008) ................... 17
Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442,958 P.2d 599 (Ct.App.1998) ................ 6
Kornfield v. Kornfield. 134 Idaho 383, 3 P.3d 61 (Ct.App.2000) ............... 13
Levin v. Levin 122 Idaho 583 (Idaho 1992) ............................... 11
Perkins v. US Transformer 132 Idaho 427 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Rife v. Long 127 Idaho 841, 908 P .2d 143 (1995) ........................... 15
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 952 P.2d 914, (Ct.App.1998) ... 5
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,
803 P.2d 993 (1991) .................................................. 5
US. Bankv. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222 (2000) .................................. 16
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 265 P.3d 502,
151 Idaho 889 (Idaho 2011) ............................................. 8
Waller v. State, 146 Idaho 234, 192 P.2d 1058 .............................. 12
Wilson v. Wilson, 131 Idaho 533,960 P.2d 1262 (1998) ...................... 5
Woods v. Sanders, 244 P.3d 197, 150 Idaho 53 (Idaho 2010) ................... 15

lll

Idaho Code
Idaho Code Section 32-706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Idaho Code Section 32-709 ................................................ 9
Idaho Code 12-120 ............... .

.. ..... 17

Idaho Code 12-121 ............... .

. ...... 6, 15

Court Rules
Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 11 ............... .

. ............ 13

Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 13
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 20
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 14
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 .................................. .15, 16, 18
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 12
Other
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 13

IV

STATEMENT OF CASE
Procedural History
June 3, 2010:

Monica Garner (Appellant) files for divorce against Chris Garner

(Respondent)
October 26, 2010:

Stipulated Decree of Divorce enters

March 16, 2012:

Respondent files Motion to Modify Decree of Divorce

October 31, 2012:

Court dismisses Motion to Modify after trial based upon Respondent's

failure to show a substantial and material change of circumstances
November 7, 2012:

Appellant files Motion to Modify Decree of Divorce (child support)

November 13, 2012: Appellants files Motion for Attorney's Fees and supporting documentation
November 20, 2012: Respondent files Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Motion to Modify
November 27, 2012: Respondent files Objection to Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees
February 19, 2013:

Court Orders an award of attorney's fees to Appellant in a reduced amount

February 26, 2013:

After hearing, the Court dismisses the Appellant's Motion to Modify

March 1, 2013:

Respondent files Motion for Attorney's Fees and supporting

documentation
March 8, 2013:

Court enters written Order to Dismiss Appellant's Motion to Modify

March 15, 2013:

Appellant files Objection to Attorney's Fees

March 29, 2013:

Appellant files District Court appeal

April 26, 2013:

Court awards Respondent's Attorney's Fees

05/15/2013:

Order Granting Attorney's Fees for $1,012.50
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05/20/2013:

Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant regarding Attorney's Fees granted on

02/24/2014:

Appealed To The Supreme Court

06/13/2014: Order Granting Attorney Fees (from District Court)
06/17/2014: Amended Notice of Appeal (including Attorney's fees)
Factual History

This appeal arises out of a Motion to Dismiss a Motion to Modify, an award of a reduced
amount of attorney's fees from a Motion to Modify, an award of attorney's fees on the Motion to
Dismiss and an award of attorney's fees on appeal.
In this case, the Appellant and Respondent obtained a divorce in 2010. Respondent,
Christopher Garner, filed a prose Motion to Modify on March 16, 2012. After hearing, the trial
court ruled that Respondent had failed to show a substantial and material change of
circumstances and dismissed Respondent's petition. Appellant filed a request for attorney's fees
in an amount in excess of $18,000. In the Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, it is clear
that counsel for the Appellant recognized this matter could be dismissed early on and even billed
Appellant for preparation of a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of filing said Motion,
Appellant chose to take the matter to trial and have it dismissed after the Respondent's case in
chief was presented. In responding to Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, the Respondent
did not deny that an award of fees should enter, but objected to the amount of Appellant's
attorney's fees. Each party submitted written argument and the trial court entered an award of
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500.00, noting that the case was not particularly complicated
and could have been disposed of at a much earlier time.
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Immediately after the court dismissed Respondent's Motion to Modify, Appellant filed a
Motion to Modify Child Support. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appellant's new
Motion. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled that Appellant had failed to show
a substantial and material change in circumstances and dismissed Appellant's Motion. Appellant
appealed the magistrate's decision to the District Court, and the District Court ruled in favor of
Respondent. Appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court properly dismissed Appellant's Petition to Modify.

2. Whether the District properly upheld the award of attorney's fees as set by the Magistrate,
3. Whether Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Standard of Review for an Order to Modify a Child Support Award at the Trial Level
and Appellate level

The decision of the trial court on a motion to modify child support is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion on appeal. The standard of review on an appeal from a child support award
is whether the court abused its discretion. A support award will not be disturbed on appeal absent
a manifest abuse of discretion. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 23, 25, 855 P.2d 484,486
(Ct.App.1993). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). However,
any interpretation of the I.C.S.G. is a question oflaw and will be reviewed freely. Robertson
Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914,916 (Ct.App.1998). Where, as here,
the trial court sat without a jury, an appellate court liberally construes the trial court's findings of
fact in favor of the judgment entered. Wilson v. Wilson, 131 Idaho 533, 535, 960 P.2d 1262,
1264 (1998).
Where the district court has acted in an appellate capacity and a further appeal is taken,
this Court independently reviews the complete record before the magistrate, but with due regard
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to the district court's decision. Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442,444, 958 P.2d 599, 601
(Ct.App.1998).
2.

Standard of Review for Attorney's Fees.

The decision to award attorney fees is discretionary with absent an abuse of the discretion, a
trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees will not be disturbed on appeal. Anti! v. Antil, 127
1261, 1265 (Ct.App.
1996). A district court may award attorney's fees
Idaho, 954,958,908 P.2d
.
.
on appeal under Idaho Code Section 12-121 only if the appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002).
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ARGUMENT
1. The Magistrate Correctly Dismissed the Appellant's Petition and the District Court Correctly
Upheld the Magistrate's Decision.
This issue is actually two separate issues: Whether this court should overturn the district
court's ruling based upon public policy and, if not, whether the Appellant showed a substantial
and material change of circumstances when bringing the petition.
Before addressing the legal strengths of Respondent's case, it must be noted that
Appellant attempted to supp01t her argument with supposition and made-up "facts." The
Appellant opines about the motivation behind the Respondent's decision to request a dismissal.
The argument set forth is neither factual nor based upon any legal justification. The opinions of
Appellant that Respondent is a bad father and a terrible person are incorrect and inappropriate for
a brief submitted to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court should not consider the slanderous
words and Respondent respectfully requests the rebuttal brief contain only arguments that have a
factual basis in the record or are based upon solid legal arguments.
a.

The Argument was Not Properly Brought Before the Magistrate.
Appellant failed to assert the public policy argument before the magistrate. As the
district cowt stated, in addition to failing to bring this issue before the magistrate, there is no
evidence in the record to support it. As a general matter, "[i]ssues not raised below and
presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered for review." Izaguirre v. R&L

Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 308 P.3d 929, 933 (2013).
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b.

The agreement does not violate public policy
In Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 265 P.3d 502, 151 Idaho 889 (Idaho
2011 ), the court found that the public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned by
the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy so
announced. The Court stated that "indeed, the contention that we could revise an unambiguous
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results is itself illogical.
In Ver ska, the court was considering an appeal from an order of the district court holding
that the statute making peer review records privileged applies, by its terms, to a lawsuit brought
against a hospital claiming that the hospital acted in bad faith in refusing to renew a physician's
privileges. In that case, Plaintiff argued that the statement of purpose accompanying that
legislation indicated that it was intended to apply only to medical malpractice actions. The
statement of purpose was not enacted into law. The Court held that "there is no wording in
section 39-1392b that limits its scope to peer review records sought in a medical malpractice
action. In that respect, the legislation is unambiguous. The asserted purpose for enacting the
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning ... If the statute as written is socially or otherwise
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." (Citations Omitted). The
interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole."

II I
Ill
Ill
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Idaho Code Section § 32-709 states as follows:
"The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to
installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a
substantial and material change of circumstances."

The statute is not ambiguous. Even if this court believes the stipulation is wrong and was
done in contravention to public policy, it is still bound to follow the law. It is not like the
Appellant did not have protections. However, as discussed more fully below, she did not avail
herself to those safeguards.
Another factor to consider is the terms of the stipulation. Child support is paid to a parent
for the purpose of ensuring a child's needs are met. In this case, the Respondent contributed
directly to the children's needs. The decree requires Respondent to assist in paying for clothing,
food, school supplies and extracurricular activities. Those are the types of items that child
support would normally cover. That the parties simply chose a more direct path for supplying
these items to the children justified a deviation from the child support guidelines. The Appellant
failed to make any showing at the hearing that the children's needs were no longer adequately
met. Also, the stipulated agreement did not contain any language that in any way limited either
party's support obligation. It fixed what the obligation was to be, in accordance with their
agreement, and this agreement was approved by the court.
In the case at bar, the trial court considered all relevant factors, including the fact that
Respondent pays a flat monetary sum to the Appellant, in addition to contributing toward
clothing, school supplies, food and extracurricular activities. The mere fact that the Appellant
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now has decided she doesn't like the agreement made at the time of the original decree does not
magically relieve her of the legal burden of proving a material and substantial change in
circumstances.
The guidelines are just that - guidelines. They may be modified or used differently
depending upon circumstances. As the district court pointed out, "the guidelines were in place at
the time of the original judgment. The parenting plan that was incorporated into the decree has a
number of facets. Both sides were represented by competent counsel, and there is no argument or
evidence that either side was misled or coerced into the agreements that were made. There is no
suggested basis to set aside the trial comi's original approval of the child support levels for any
reason. The mere fact that the dollar amount of child support deviated from the guidelines at the
time of the original judgment is in-elevant at this juncture."
Another factor to consider when determining whether deviation from the child
support guidelines is a per se violation of public policy is the fact that both sides were
represented by counsel. It should be noted that Appellant was not only represented by an
attorney at all stages of the proceeding, but that her attorney was Stanley Welsh, who is a wellknown and highly respected family law attorney, lecturer and author. It should also be noted that
the decree of divorce was prepared by Appellant's attorney, including the child support amount.
Appellant argued vigorously that her agreement put her in an impossible position.
However, when considering public policy, the court should also consider the options Appellant
had from which to choose. First, she could have exercised her right to litigate the issue of child
suppmi and custody in lieu of entering into a stipulation. Second, if she felt she had not chosen
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wisely at the time of the original decree, she was given a second chance to litigate the issue when
the Respondent brought forth a modification motion. Instead of allowing the Respondent the
opportunity to argue the merits of his request to spend more time with his children, the Appellant
fought the Motion and, eventually, won. Had she chosen to file a Counter Claim for increased
child support, both parties would have had the opportunity to get what they desired - the
Respondent more time with his children and the Appellant more money.
c. Even if Magistrate Lee's decision was in error, the Appellant failed to argue it within the time
prescribed by law or in the manner prescribed by law.
The Appellant is requesting this court make a collateral attack of the original judgment,
which is improper. In Levin v. Levin 122 Idaho 583 (Idaho 1992), the father was awarded
primary custody and the mother was ordered, by stipulation, to pay $1000 per month in child
support. However, the mother was quite wealthy, raking in about $13,000,000 from a trust.
Eventually, the mother sought custody. The father opposed the change in custody and moved to
increase child support. The court found no material change of circumstances and denied the
mother's motion, but granted father's request for increased child support to $10,000 per month.
The trial court held that the award of $1,000 per month was overly restrictive and did not take
into account the factors required by 32-706. The Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial
court's decision stating: "The trial court's p01irayal of the prior magistrate's support award as
being overly restrictive and not giving adequate weight to the 1980 amendments to LC. § 32-706,
amounted to a collateral attack on the earlier court's judgment which had not been appealed."
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In this case, the Appellant should have brought a Motion pursuant to IRCP, Rule 60,
which states
" On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six
(6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion
does not require leave from the Supreme Cami, or the district court, as the case may be, as
though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon appeal to that comi. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after
judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not personally served with
summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has
failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."
As the district court noted "A motion to modify child support should not be a substitute
for a timely objection or challenge to the support issue in the trial court before the entry of
judgment, or to a timely challenge to the judgment itself under I.R.C.P. 60 or its equivalents, or
to a timely appeal from the judgment. See Waller v. State, 146 Idaho 234,239, 192 P.3d 1058,
1063 (2008) ("The trial court found, and we agree, that I.R.C.P. 60(b) is the only identifiable
legal basis for Waller's request to set aside or vacate the child support order ... by exercise of the
court's equitable powers .... I.R.C.P. 60(b) also recognizes the district court's authority to entertain
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment on the basis of equity.
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The Appellant could have also appealed the judgment. Idaho Appellate Rule 11
grants "an appeal of the matter of right from certain judgments and court orders." Pursuant to
IAR 14 appeals are made effective "only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of
the District Court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the
court on any judgment order or decree of the District Court appealable as a matter of right in any
civil or criminal action." The Appellant did not file an appeal and the time to file such an appeal
has expired.
2. The magistrate properly dismissed Appellant's petition for her failure to show a substantial and
material change of circumstances.
The well-established law in Idaho is that while the court does have continuing
jurisdiction over the matter of child support, once support is fixed by final decree of a court it is
subject to modification only upon a showing of a permanent and substantial change in
circumstances. Kornfield v. Kornfield. 134 Idaho 383,385, 3 P.3d 61, 63 (Ct.App.2000). The
decision of the trial court on a motion to modify child support is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion on appeal. The party seeking modification carries the burden of proof. Humberger v.
Humberger, 134 Idaho 39,42-43,995 P.2d 809, 812-13 (2000).

There does not appear to be any bright line rule as to how much of an increase in income
constitutes a "substantial" change. However, the words used in the statute, "material" and
"substantial", are easily defined. Substantial is defined as "ofreal worth or importance; of
considerable value; valuable." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Material is defined as
"imp01iant; more or less necessary; having influence or effect." Black Law Dictionary, 6th
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edition. In the absence of a concrete rule, the legislature and the higher courts have clearly left a
large amount of discretion with the trial judge.
In this case, had the Respondent paid the suggested support as set forth by the guidelines,
the increase would have been negligible. Appellant is trying to convince this court that the
difference in child support is $711.50. If the Court agrees with this argument, litigants can make
any deal about child support and then tum around the next day and file a motion to modify, not
based on a substantial change of circumstances, but based upon the fact they simply changed
their mind. This is ludicrous. If the parties had agreed to the amount recommended by the
guidelines instead of the more direct agreement they did enter into, the Respondent's increase in
child support would have nominal and not substantial in the least.
As noted in the District Court's opinion, the evidence was not in dispute that the only
change in circumstances since the entry of judgment that applied to child support was a change
of approximately $3,000 per year in the difference between the parties' annual earnings - which
amounted to an approximate 7% change overall. The District Court found that "If applied ... ,
this would have meant a change of less than $4 per month."
The district court went on to explain that
"Plaintiff relies upon Section 5 of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6),
which provides that "the amount of child support provided for under these Guidelines may
constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for granting a motion for
modification for child support obligations" (emphasis added). I think the only consistent way to
read this provision is that the adoption of the rule could be a "change in circumstance" if the
amount of support under the rule differed from an existing level of child support. Further if the
guidelines as a whole are amended up or down, the event of such amendment might constitute a
change supporting modification.
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Here, it appears that the rule establishing the support guidelines was in existence when
the original divorce degree was entered into, and there is no claim or evidence that the guidelines
have been changed in any material fashion in the interim. To argue that a statute or rule that was
in existence at the time of an event can be used to demonstrate a substantial change in
circumstance after entry of a final judgment on that event would make no sense and flies in the
face of the principle of finality of judgments and decrees
In any event, because Section 5 uses the term "may," there is no basis for this court to
conclude that the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, erred finding that the plaintiff had
not established a substantial and material change of circumstances. See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho
841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather
than the imperative or mandatory meaning of 'must' or' shall.')."
3. The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he awarded Appellant Attorney's Fees
in the amount of $2500 and Respondent fees in the amount of $1012.50.
In Woods v. Sanders, 244 P.3d 197, 150 Idaho 53 (Idaho 2010), the magistrate found that
the "factors have been met as set forth in Idaho Code § 12-121 for an award to Plaintiff of his
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter." At trial, the magistrate stated: "Based on the answer
provided by Ms. Sanders and the documents she has filed, I am going to grant your motion based
on 12-121. Because Sanders did not provide any admissible evidence to support her defense
against the modification for child custody other than the unsupported allegations presented in her
affidavit, and because she failed to attend the trial or any other hearing, the magistrate had
sufficient evidence to conclude that Sanders acted unreasonably in defending the modification
motion. Therefore, the magistrate did not abuse its discretion and this Court affirms the award of
attorney fees."
A magistrate may also reduce the amount of attorney's fees requested. Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e )(1) states in pertinent part that "In any civil action the court may
award reasonable attorney fees ... " (emphasis added). The Court is to consider the factors set
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forth in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e )(3 ), but is not required to address each one or
make written findings. See US Bank v. Kuenzli 134 Idaho 222 (2000); Perkins v. US

Transformer 132 Idaho 427 (1999).

In this case, the court reasonably found that at the trial level, Appellant's Motion to
Modify was unsupported and frivolous. The Appellant failed to prove there was a permanent
and material change in circumstances which would justify a change is support. In this instant
case, the Respondent was the prevailing party as defined by Idaho Civil Rule 54(d)(l )(B.) When
requesting attorney's fees, the Respondent submitted a reasonable amount of fees and addressed
all relevant factors as follows:
"(A) The time and labor required: The approximate amount of time spent in the defense of
this matter was seven (7) hours. The hours are itemized in the memorandum of costs filed
concurrently herewith.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions: There was no novel or particularly difficult
issues raised.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the experience and ability of the
attorney in the particular field of law: This is a case easily handled by an attorney versed in
matters of family law. Attorney Kelso was licensed in 1996 and has worked in the general
practice of law for approximately seventeen (17) years.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work: The amount billed was $150 per hour. It is believed
this amount is equal to the fees charged by local counsel.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fee was hourly.
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(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case: There were no
unusual time limitations or unusual circumstances of this case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained: The total time put into this case by counsel
was approximately seven (7) hours, not including the preparation of the Motion for Fees and
attendant documents. The Defendant was the prevailing party and the court ruled the plaintiff
has no basis in law for filing the modification.
(H) The undesirability of the case: This case was no more undesirable than any other case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: This was counsel's
first representation of this particular client (concurrent with the objection to attorney's fees filed
after the Defendant's Petition for Modification was dismissed.)
(J) Awards in similar cases: Unknown.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if
the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case: One (1) hour ofresearch
was performed for the purpose of providing case law to the Court regarding the need for a party
to show a substantial change in circumstances and to determine if an Idaho Court had ruled on
what constitutes a material change with regard to increased salaries for purposes of calculating
child support."
In Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 196 P.3d 341, 146 Idaho 423 (Idaho 2008), the court awarded
a reduced amount of attorney's fees. The higher court found that the District Court did not
reduce it in the proper manner. The court held that "The amount of attorney's fees to be
awarded under LC.§ 12-120(3) is committed to the district court's discretion. (Citations
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omitted). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass' v. Neibaur 133 Idaho 402,412, 987
P .2d 314, 324 (Idaho 1999) .. a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the
issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. (citation
omitted). When awarding attomey1s fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate."
(citations omitted). Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of the factors.

Id. However, the bottom line in an award of attorney's fees is reasonableness."
In this case, the magistrate propetiy reduced Appellant's attorney's fees. When
reducing the Appellant's award of fees from over $18,000 to $2500, Magistrate Frates wrote a
detailed opinion found in the record at pages 158 through 163. It properly considered all the
criteria set forth in rule 54. When ordering the Respondent attorney's fees of a approximately
$1000, Judge Frates did not write a detailed order but clearly stated the justification on the record
and noted the oral statements in the judgment.
The Appellant, in her request for attorney's fees, asked the court for an award
totaling approximately $18,000. The Court properly considered several factors, including the
short lifespan of the case, the ease of trial, and the fact the defendant was prose. In addition, it
was clear at the pretrial held September 17, 2012. the Court did not believe a material change in
circumstances had occmTed. (See Pre-Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 18-21; and p. 8, 1. 17-20). At
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that point (or even at some earlier point), it would have been prudent and efficient for the
Appellant to file a Motion to Dismiss. In fact, as stated in the Respondent's Objection to
Attorney's Fees, Appellant actually prepared a Motion to Dismiss but never filed it. Had
Appellant done so, the case would have been summarily dismissed without need for further
expenditures.

In addition, the attorney's fees sought by Appellant were excessive and umeasonable.
Both Appellant and Respondent sought a modification. Both parties lost due to their failures to
show a material and substantial change of circumstances. Ironically, the parties virtually identical
issues had identical outcomes. However, the difference in cost to get there was over $17,000.
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in awarding fees to the Respondent, nor did
he abuse his discretion in reducing the award to Appellant.
With regard to the award of fees as the district com1 level, that too is reasonable.

Respondent's Brief 19

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL - ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Respondent is asserting his claim for
attorney's fees for the defense of this appeal. This appeal was brought furiously and without
merit. It was not based upon legal justification and the facts failed to support any of the
Appellant's arguments.
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CONCLUSION

The Appellant's arguments for overturning the magistrate and district court are without
a legal basis or justification. The trial court and district court provided sound legal justification
for the entry of two awards of attorney's fees to the Respondent and a reduced amount of
attorney's fees for the Appellate. In addition, the courts correctly held that the Appellant had
failed to show a material and substantial change of circumstances and correctly dismissed her
petition. Furthermore, this appeal is frivolous and without merit, justifying an award of
attorney's fees and costs to the Respondent. Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests this
court deny Appellant's appeal, uphold the lower courts and award Respondent Attorney Fees and
Costs for defense of this appeal.
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